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in the Era of
Managed Care
Aimee E. Marlow
Physicians have long enjoyed prestige, power, and autonomy, but the rise of man-
aged care organizations has drastically changed their status. Many doctors are in
thrall to the financial well-being of the corporations that employ them, their
knowledge and expertise controlled and manipulated in the interest of profit maxi-
mization. This article investigates the professional decline of physicians, citing the
use of gag clauses, incentives to withhold care, and the breakdown of their author-
ity. In an effort to regain some measure of control, physicians have taken their
concerns to the public, supporting state and federal legislation that attempts to
curb questionable managed care practices, but this new alliance is unreliable. The
author evaluates the history and ultimate failure of California 's propositions 214
and 216, both created to protect patients and physicians. The results clearly sug-
gest that physician influence alone can no longer sway public opinion.
Physicians, facing deprofessionalization in the new corporate structure of medicine,
are losing a tremendous amount of power. Some no longer control the simplest
medical decisions, for example, what they may tell patients and what tests they may or
may not administer. 1 The few who downplay the importance of such restrictions fail to
recognize that "the fate of patients is tied to the fate of doctors."2 In other words, the
attenuation of medical practice is an issue not only for physicians, but for all who con-
sult them. This article examines several of the myriad details regarding the state of U.S.
medicine.
What Is a Profession?
Sociologists have long studied the rise of U.S. professionalization, a product of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which increased dramatically during and after
the Industrial Revolution, leading to growth of large bureaucracies. 3 As society devel-
oped more complex structures, institutions flourished, and the need for experts and
leaders quickly became evident. 4 Technical training and leadership capabilities sepa-
rated the professional from the lay person. 5 The literature of sociology acknowledges
that in aspiring to professionalization, an occupation generally "strives to attain" the
following characteristics and goals:
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1. Altruistic service to clients and society:
2. A basic liberal education followed by professional and technical training;
3. Licensure by the state . . . The criteria for licensure and practice . . .
should be drawn up [in]. . . consultation [with] practitioners representing
the profession.
4. The competence of professionals is judged by other professionals;
5. Professional practices continually directed by the body of theory and re-
search relevant to the field; and
6. A code of professional ethics . . . continually developed, corrected, and
enforced by the profession itself.6
The link between integrity, service, and appreciation for knowledge, evident in all
six points, places a large responsibility on members of an occupation to uphold its pro-
fessional status. Their reward for achieving success is great, for the professional gains
the right "[of] freedom, not only to do his work according to his own best judgment . . .
but also to choose his own style of work and economy of effort."" This model reflects
medicine as it should be and what most Americans expect it to be: an altruistic profes-
sion embodying integrity, autonomy, and ethical accountability.
Professional knowledge and theory are particularly important. Physicians, who tradi-
tionally rely on their interpretive wisdom to separate them from other professions, se-
cure a coveted niche in society as healers. Basic medical knowledge, a touchstone offer-
ing them a sense of the role they should play, serves to separate patient from physician.
We trust physicians with one of our most valued possessions, our health; their role en-
compasses strong "moral and social functions." 8 Everett Hughes notes that, in general,
professions "also claim a broad legal, moral, and intellectual mandate."9 He adds, "Not
only do the practitioners, by virtue of gaining admission to the charmed circle of the
profession, individually exercise a license to do things that others do, but collectively
they presume to tell society what is good and right for it in a broad and crucial aspect of
life."
10 Medicine fits this mold exactly. Physicians and patients have a give-and-take
relationship: patients give their trust to doctors, whose moral and intellectual obliga-
tions, they are confident, will safeguard them from harm.
In rising to dominance, physicians met all the criteria noted above, benefiting first
from structural changes in society and later from their collective power. Prior to gaining
authority in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, doctors encountered a host
of obstacles. :: Without a scientifically sound body of knowledge and a lack of "unity
. . . and collective authority," physicians required grounding. 12 The traditional view of
illness that dominated society aggravated the issue. Paul Starr writes, "Many Americans
who already had a rationalist, activist orientation to disease refused to accept physicians
as authoritative. They believed that common sense and native intelligence could deal as
effectively with most problems of health and illness:" 13
The late nineteenth century, a time of great cultural, scientific, and social change,
greatly influenced the state of all professions. The United States embarked on a "cul-
tural revolution," when "Americans became willing to acknowledge and institutionalize
their dependence on professions." 1" In addition, the Industrial Revolution brought about
the urbanization of life in America and a new reliance on complex organizations with
hierarchical structures, which became comfortable and accepted. The term "profes-
sional" represented power, wealth, and advanced education, all qualities revered in
societv.
Concurrently, physicians acquired the knowledge that granted them access to and
control over grounded scientific "evidence/* Advances in "'diagnostic technology . . .
strengthened [their] powers ... in physical examination of the patient." Science also
developed tests for "specific . . . disease," and in the 1880s, the organisms "responsible
in tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid, and diphtheria were isolated"; by the 1890s, "labora-
tory tests had been introduced to detect [them]." 15 Thanks to science and to society,
physicians started gaining power.
But other hindrances remained; structural changes came from within the profession
and physicians at first lacked a strong collective society that could represent them.
More troublesome was the profession's lack of a "fixed track" for education; "whether
or not a physician went to medical school and if he did. for how long and with what
general education, were all variable." 16 Such ambiguities left plenty of room for alterna-
tive forms of treatment like homeopathy and eclectic medicine to enter the market.
Even as late as 1900, "the ports of entry into medicine were still wide open and the
unwelcome passed through in great numbers." 17
The formation of the American Medical Association fAMA) in 1847 was an attempt
to give physicians an organizational foundation, but more important, the AMA sought
to standardize medical education with a view toward eliminating alternative medicine. 18
Initially, the organization suffered from internal conflict and lack of structure but re-
mained dedicated -ito [addressing] the problem that originally motivated its formation,
control of medical education." 19 In 1904 the AMA formed the Council on Medical Edu-
cation, which set standards for medical schools, including increasing the preparation
time necessary to become a doctor of medicine and mandating that all physicians pass
state licensing examinations before being allowed to practice.
The 1906 Flexner committee, in a report that investigated the country's 160 medical
schools, concluded that only 82 achieved adequate standards for medical education.20
The best were encouraged to remain open, while the weaker would be closed or merge
with stronger institutions. This tremendous overhaul of the educational system "greatly
increased the homogeneity and cohesiveness of the profession [and] instilled common
values and beliefs among doctors . . . and . . . discouraged sectarian divisions."21
Standardization of medical education provided other benefits as well, enabling doc-
tors to truly define the role of physician. The lines of distinction drawn between doctors
and other health care professionals were changed in the twentieth century. Hughes ex-
trapolates: "The elaboration of the organization of hospitals, clinics, and public-health
agencies combined with great technological change in medicine and an immense in-
crease in the demand for medical services has led to a great reshuffling in the whole
medical system."- The reshuffling led to more power and autonomy for physicians. The
profession simply passed along certain duties, such as taking blood pressure or filing
forms, to other workers. 23 This served to set physicians even further apart, for menial,
time-consuming tasks were no longer their responsibility.
By pushing forward and successfully taking advantage of the structural changes
occurring on the national level, physicians ascended to the professional ranks, continu-
ing through the post-World War II era. The new advances in scientific technology that
appeared, "making [medicine] more effective in treating illness." were coupled with
federal money for new hospitals and "the explosion of private health insurance.*'2" Phy-
sicians attained an unimaginable level of resources and wealth.
The boom in the medical industry presented people with previously unirnagined
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prospects for making money; many physicians took advantage of the potential bonanza,
adding the role of businessman to their persona.25 Investment opportunities took many
forms, but none was as lucrative as those offered by pharmaceuticals, an industry which
by the mid-1950s was worth $4.5 billion. 26 It seemed reasonable for physicians to in-
vest in these companies, for as Howard Wolinsky and Tom Brune noted, "doctors knew
something about the drugs they prescribed."27
But the public did not buy this explanation. For the first time, people were forced to
realize that "doctors' clinical judgment [could be] influenced by their business inter-
ests."
28 Overwhelmingly, they rejected the physician as businessman. People were
clearly uncomfortable and threatened by the thought that doctors could be persuaded to
prescribe the products of drug companies in which they had a financial interest rather
than more appropriate medications. 29 Recognizing the loss of public trust, the AMA
denounced doctors' involvement with these organizations. In a further effort to polish
the tarnished image of physicians, AMA delegate Dr. Edwin B. Dunphy declared in
June 1952, "The medical profession is not a luxury business but a profession dedicated
to rendering service to humanity. Reward or financial gain is a subordinate consider-
ation. Physicians should never lose sight of this principle. If they do, the medical pro-
fession will certainly be government regulated eventually and [emphasis added] with
public approval."30 One might assume that such bad publicity and public disapproval
would have deterred physicians from involving themselves in business ventures, but as
history tells us, it didn't. For the most part, corporate medicine found physicians to be
willing participants.
Evolution of For-Proflt HMOs
Dunphy had no inkling of the future of medicine and its business alliances. Today, re-
flecting on his words, one questions how far medicine has come and if the lessons of
the past taught anything. The success of physicians in their pursuit of professionalism
involved luck. Being positioned more than once in history to take advantage of societal
changes is remarkable for any profession; the specific events noted above comprise a
few such fortuitous examples in the chronicles of physicians. But what is also evident
from Dunphy is that more than forty years ago, doctors, even when they held the upper
hand, feared a corporate threat to their integrity.
Modern for-profit HMOs and corporate medicine do not offer physicians the power
to reject or dispute the corporations. The managed care concept first gained popularity
in the early 1980s. 31 Most HMOs maintained a nonprofit status until 1987, their main
theoretical purpose for existence based upon utilitarianism and rationalization, namely,
to provide for as many people as possible quality health care at the least expense. As
Wendy Mariner stated, "The goals of managed care came to be seen as the efficient use
of health care resources ... to provide quality care."32 By 1987, "there were 650 HMOs
with about 29 million members."33
Early nonprofit HMOs, seemingly adhering to the original purpose, "encouraged
coordinate care, [including] preventive services, in long-term personal relationships
between patients and primary care providers."34 Moving managed care into the competi-
tive market and making it a for-profit industry apparently offered improved quality and
efficiency overall since "increased competition could achieve the goals [of] providing
good quality care."35 The success of profit-making HMOs depended largely on physi-
cians' ability to keep a "foot in both the medical and the business camps" and its suc-
cess in performing "both medical and business functions, taking actions to provide or
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withhold care that touches the traditional sphere of medicine, and, at the same time,
acting like ordinary business enterprises with no moral obligation or, at least, obliga-
tions that have little to do with traditional medical ethics."36
In the model under discussion, medical ethics and business concerns are accorded
equal priority. Although this was the intent of for-profit HMOs, it was not borne out in
reality. When faced with conflicts between providing "quality medical care and . . .
obligations to preserve their assets," profit-making HMOs favored the needs of the cor-
poration, not the profession. 37 Business concerns that "put profits before patients" are
now "the palpable force destroying care."38
Recent Voices: Ignored but Prophetic
The rise of for-profit HMOs and the subsequent deprofessionalization of physicians
should not surprise Americans. Although many people spend time and effort evaluating
the present state of medicine, they fail to integrate one crucial piece of information:
physicians and sociologists predicted all of today's events more than ten years ago. The
most compelling prophecies were those of Paul Starr and Eliot Freidson, both medical
sociology experts, and George Lundberg, longtime editor of the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association.
In the final chapter of The Social Transformation ofAmerican Medicine, Starr
painted a dreary picture of the future of American medicine. He envisioned a time when
the corporation, or "private sector," would step in to "rationalize" medical services,
taking over faltering public institutions. As corporations appropriated medicine, new
challenges to physician autonomy and prestige would be inevitable, and in an extreme
case, "doctors will no longer have as much power over such basic issues as when they
retire."
39 One backlash of this trend also brings to light for Starr another obstacle,
namely, boundaries. He says, "Another key issue will be the boundary between medical
and business decisions; when both medical and economic considerations are relevant,
which will prevail and who will decide? ... A regime of medical austerity will test the
limits of professional autonomy in the corporate world."40
Also at issue, according to Starr, was the "different techniques for modifying the
behavior of physicians, getting them to accept the management's outlook."41 Physicians
will be "socialized" not merely as doctors but as corporate spokesmen, learning "to do
things the way the plan or the company has them done."42
But his most chilling vision of the future seemed to be the most prophetic. Starr
believed that the medical profession's and the public's complete inability to control the
situation was an invitation to corporations to turn medicine into a for-profit industry.
"Instead of public financing for prepaid plans," he wrote, "there will be corporate fi-
nancing for private plans . . . whose interests will be determined by the rate of return on
investments."43
Freidson also feared for the future of medicine. He too recognized the emergence of
the corporation as the biggest threat to the profession and, more specifically, turned
attention to the detrimental role of inducements to cut health care costs. Freidson as-
serted that "considerably less emphasis on economic incentives would greatly improve
the spirit in which practitioners approach their work."44 More idealistic than Starr, he
believed that a "greater emphasis on professional values" would be the only way to
repair the ailing reputation of American physicians. 45
Freidson predicted that the medical community would face a "critical choice" that
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would determine the future. "We can passively accept a health care system that, in the
interest of cost containment, slowly moves toward mechanizing and bureaucratizing
services. Or we can actively choose to struggle for a system that . . . [is] designed to do
everything it can to improve the unique lots of all those who need help."46 The first
choice has "physicians and health care workers [following] elaborate rules of proce-
dure" and "patients [as] standardized objects," while the second focuses on "truly hu-
man health services."47
In closing, Freidson takes issue with the way the industrialization of medicine will
inevitably lead to "the loss of something precious" for both physicians and patients.
Within a mechanized health care system, doctors "will have lost the opportunity to do
autonomous, challenging, and creative work" and patients will "lose the opportunity to
regain . . . their full potential."
48
Sociologists were not alone in addressing the problems facing the medical commu-
nity and physicians. In a 1985 editorial, Lundberg lashed out at his own profession,
focusing on how "we, the aggregate medical profession, are in big trouble with the
public at large."49 The problems he reports surround the issue of trust, but not technical
or personal trust. Rather, he believes that the real issue is patients who do not trust phy-
sicians economically or morally. He states, "Never in modern history has the medical
profession been weaker ... To a great extent, physicians are becoming seen as highly
successful businessmen who are functioning with the business ethic rather than the
professional ethic . . . We are viewed by many as a restrictive cartel."50 Thus, industrial-
izing medicine has bankrupted the profession of any morality. In this scenario, both
physicians and patients pay.
Lundberg substantiates this point by citing longitudinal data that reflected a severe
decline in patients' trust of physicians, specifically in the area of money. "In 1982, 42%
of the public queried expressed the opinion that physician fees were reasonable. This
declined 15 points to 27% in 1984, a shocking change."51
As an insider in the medical profession, Lundberg, is critical of the conflict of inter-
est between the physician as businessperson and the physician as healer. He offers vari-
ous solutions to the problems at hand, calling on doctors to "reestablish the fact that . . .
as physicians, we will represent the best interests of our patients and the public."52
Changing their image was not enough; Lundberg challenged physicians to "change
reality, thereby becoming viewed as primarily proactive rather than reactive . . . pro-
moting rather than opposing progress."53
In financial matters, Lundberg implored all physicians to be aware of each person's
"financial circumstances," to adjust payment to need when necessary. He emphasized
the need for physicians to take a "leadership position" in cost management and contain-
ment and to be "intolerant of devious cost shifting and of questionable creative account-
ing."54 Above all, physicians "should promote openness and full disclosure of facts
because the truth is more central to medical science and to the practice of medicine
than any other human endeavor."55
Lundberg's conclusions provided room for hope, positive change, and the possibility
of a bright future, but it was all contingent on physicians' reverting to "caring for the
public," choosing altruism over greed, and taking a stand against unethical practices. 56
So far doctors have failed to rise to the occasion. Why is that so important? From a
professional point of view, it means no more than successfully adhering to the Hippo-
cratic oath, which asserts "that physicians have duties to (1) be loyal to patients; (2) act
in their patients' interests; (3) make their patients their first consideration, even when
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their own financial well-being is opposed."57 Physicians are, more than just technicians,
accepted experts of the body working in an American society obsessed with life and
death. We expect a social contract in which the professional physician serves us as ef-
fectively as possible.
Declining Power and Prestige
The shifts in American medicine are clearly leading to physicians' losing power, which
results in deprofessionalization. In the six criteria for all professions, profit-making
HMOs rob physicians of their ability (1) to be "altruistic servants," as indicated by the
role of monetary incentives to reduce treatment; (2) to have their work and competence
judged by other physicians, because the very structure of managed care works against
camaraderie and collective activity; and most important, (3) to use medical knowledge
to its fullest in a variety of contexts, for their authority and autonomy are tempered by
gag clauses in managed care contracts, which determine what physicians can and can-
not tell their patients and the public.
Altruism has long been a tenet of the medical profession. Many who enter the field
speak of "the call," the need to help others and to save lives. 58 The ethics and mission of
medicine encourage nothing less than physicians doing everything possible to help
patients, but for-profit HMOs remove this crucial element by establishing financial
incentives for physicians to reduce services.
Managed care corporations introduced incentives only a few years ago, recognizing
that "other approaches, such as administrative monitoring and penalties for overuse
[were] less effective" in curbing physicians from excessively offering or wasting re-
sources. 59 There are obvious flaws in this reasoning according to Marc Rodwin. "If
incentives to provide services cause physicians to use too many resources and to per-
form unnecessary procedures, would not incentives to reduce services result in too few
services? . . . How can we be sure physicians will reduce only unnecessary or wasteful
services?"60
Financial incentives are wrapped in various packages. In their most blatant form,
they deter physicians from administering expensive diagnostic tests. 61 In another form,
HMOs "significantly reduce hospitalization," often forcing patients out the door after
major surgery. 62, 63 A large proportion of a physician's salary may be contingent on such
incentives. In 1995, "74% of independent-practice association HMOs and 50% of
group-model or staff-model HMOs [based] physicians' payment in part on measures of
utilization and cost."64 In doing so, such for-profit managed care organizations as US
Healthcare bind "primary care physicians' interests to [those of] the [firm] . . . Income
is tethered to conduct that furthers corporate profitability."65 Physicians are rewarded,
"sometimes quite directly, for doing less for their patients," an "inherent conflict of
interest."
66 This cuts to the very heart of the altruistic nature of the profession, calling
into question the moral and ethical implications of such activity.
The declining importance of altruism is related to how and by whom physicians are
judged. Doctors have long enjoyed the ability to oversee their profession's educational
standards, ethical codes, and the opportunity to rate one another's performance.67 Per-
formance review is of specific concern. Physicians working within the for-profit HMO
structure find that the quality of their work is based not on their ability to be good prac-
titioners, providing excellent care and developing trust with patients, but on their ability
to cut costs and generate returns.
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The system of for-profit HMO denies physicians the opportunity to foster relation-
ships not only with patients but with other physicians. The new wave of corporate medi-
cine includes a loose collection of physicians who work in various locations for the
same entity. Thus, some HMOs are composed not of "a core of dedicated staff' but of
"networks and private practitioners linked by part-time contracts."68 Solidarity among
physicians is impossible in an arrangement that has "forced practitioners to reorganize
into larger units."
69 Such an elaborate structure makes measuring performance and qual-
ity of care an intricate, at times frustrating experience.
These issues are important indicators of the deprofessionalization of medicine. Yet
the control of medical knowledge through the restrictions is the most solid, telling
gauge of the trend. The value of medical knowledge and the public's trust in it is a sig-
nificant element in the physician-patient relationship. Placing a high value on knowl-
edge presumably upholds the "legal, moral, and intellectual mandate" of medicine.70
But in the new design of managed care, expertise and knowledge are exploited and
controlled for the good of the corporation, perhaps best exemplified by the use of gag
clauses or rules. Generally, these take several forms, all of which potentially impose
constraints on the physician-patient relationship and on doctors' overall autonomy. The
clauses, to which physicians have to agree, are written into their contracts with man-
aged care organizations. Gag clauses eliminate alternative treatments that the managed
care organizations view as unnecessary or inappropriate for any number of medical
conditions. Physicians who defy these stipulations face, at the least, reprimands, and at
the most, dismissal.
Legal experts identify four types of gag rules, the first of which places "restrictions
[on] doctor-patient discussion of treatment alternatives."71 The rules specifically pro-
hibit physicians from "disclosing treatment options that the [managed care organiza-
tion] determines are inappropriate."72 This restriction declares that physicians may not
discuss alternative treatments with a patient "until the plan has agreed to pay for
them"73 and gives its approval. If the corporation deems them unsuitable, physicians
may not reveal an alternative to the patients.
This type of clause also prohibits physicians from "making statements to patients
that would undermine the patient's confidence in the [HMO]."74 A doctor who disagrees
with an organization's actions may not reveal his or her opinion to a patient. In addi-
tion, "suggesting that a course of treatment may be beneficial or even life-saving, but
reporting that the plan will not cover it, could be construed as disparaging or as suggest-
ing that the plan offers substandard care."75 The physician, unable to share all treatment
options with the patient, may feel trapped.
A second type of gag clause prevents physicians from "discussing conflicts of inter-
est with patients."76 A doctor may not reveal the terms of his or her agreement of asso-
ciation with the managed care organization. Most important, physicians cannot reveal
how they are paid, for this is considered a "business secret requiring protection."77 They
cannot bare the fact that the amount of their paycheck is, to a large extent, contingent
on the treatment options they choose for patients — less treatment translates to larger
salary — which could negatively affect a patient's health.
Another gag clause restricts doctors' ability to recommend facilities where patients
can receive treatment outside their care organization. Physicians are forbidden to rec-
ommend "uncovered treatments" even if they believe such alternatives could help their
patients"78 This rule also prevents physicians from giving advice on the nature of man-
aged care organizations or "offering their perspective on what plans are better for
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patients in general, or [one] patient in particular"; therefore, some of their expertise is
denied to patients. 79
A final gag rule precludes physicians from publicly "making negative comments
about the plan" with which they are associated. 80 It serves to keep physicians silent in
the public debate on managed care, for they are "unable to offer candidly their experi-
ences and expertise to patients and political debates alike."81 Public discussion is com-
promised by the denial of a voice to these eminent actors.
The nationwide debates on the subject of gag clauses grow more heated as these
stipulations are gradually leaked to the public. Yet because of vague language that "dis-
guises" them, the clauses are sometimes difficult to locate in managed care contracts.
Additionally, a "lack of any [nationwide] centralized clearinghouse for contract infor-
mation" that monitors all managed care contracts makes the search even more cumber-
some. 82 This scarcity of information adds controversy to the mixture. Proponents of
managed care organizations deny the very existence of such clauses in physicians' con-
tracts, claiming that the agreements are fashioned with patient protection in mind. Op-
ponents insist that these clauses are commonplace, that they blatantly "violate the
physician's ethical duties," and that they must be outlawed immediately. 83
Controversy aside, the very notion of gag clauses leads to disturbing conclusions
about this method of cost cutting. Such rules directly threaten the welfare of patients by
controlling the use of medical knowledge. They "threaten to erode the doctor-patient
relationship by silencing physicians and keeping patients uninformed."84 They raise
important legal, ethical, and even constitutional questions. Legally, they pose dilemmas
specifically around the doctrine of informed consent: patients "should be autonomous
over their bodies, which requires that physicians inform patients of their conditions and
options for treatment."85 According to the doctrine, a doctor must inform a patient of all
alternatives. As previously noted, rules that do not allow for full disclosure of informa-
tion violate the doctrine of informed consent. "Gag clauses that prohibit physician dis-
closure of uncovered treatment threaten to turn back the clock to a time when patients
were kept uninformed of their alternatives and physicians made treatment decisions
without regard to the patient's concern."86
Failing to adhere to the doctrine of informed consent suggests that, legally, physi-
cians are not doing their job, which can leave them wide open to charges of malprac-
tice.
87 Ethically, gag clauses place physicians in potentially difficult situations, unable
to "advance the patient's health," the overarching goal of medicine. 88 Ethics seems to
run a distant second to profit maximization in the new calling of corporate medicine.
John McArthur and Francis Moore write, "When a corporation employing physicians
seeks profit by selling [its] services, the physician-employees cease to act as free
agents. Professional commitment to patient care is now subordinated to new rules of
practice that assure profitability of the corporation."89
Another important consideration is the way gag clauses threaten constitutional
rights of doctors by withdrawing their freedom of speech.90 Some forcibly keep
physicians' voices out of the public domain on health care issues, and violation of these
terms is cause for the dismissal of doctors. Therefore, "a gag rule is an example of the
loss of free speech, not by order of public law, but by the dictates of health care corpo-
rations."91
US Healthcare, one of the nation's largest for-profit HMO corporations, provides an
excellent example of manipulation through gag rules. In 1995 it cared for 2.4 million
members, earning a profit of $1 million a day. 92 Steffie Woolhandler and David
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Himmelstein note the following clauses from a US Healthcare contract with one HMO.
"Physicians shall agree not to take any action or make any communication which un-
dermines or could undermine the confidence of enrollees, potential enrollees, their
employers, their unions, or the public in US Healthcare or the quality of US Healthcare
coverage . . . Physicians shall keep the Proprietary Information [payment rates, utiliza-
tion-review procedures, and so on] and this Agreement strictly confidential."93 Trans-
lated, these clauses state that physicians cannot openly disagree with US Healthcare on
any ground and that any cost the HMO assumes or does not assume must not be dis-
closed to the patient.
In addition, releasing an employee who disagrees with company policy is also part of
the reality. After coauthoring "Extreme Risk," and speaking out against certain HMO
policies on national talk shows, David Himmelstein, "on December 1, 1995, received
notice from US Healthcare of his termination."94
Gag clauses, which reduce the value of a physician's knowledge to monetary terms,
deleting moral and intellectual components from the picture, are only one of several
questionable tactics created by managed care corporations whose primary concern is
profit realization. In an effort to combat corporate control, more and more physicians
are turning to the public for support, a move that has both positive and negative effects.
On the positive side, physicians and patients working together represent increased
people power and increased opportunity for physicians to educate the public about the
potential harm profit-making HMO policy can generate. For example, many profes-
sional doctors organizations have produced offspring in the form of patient organiza-
tions. Physicians Who Care, a group of more than 30,000 doctors, is allied with the
15,000 members of Patients Who Care.
Yet bringing concerns to the public and inviting citizens to join forces with them has
not necessarily resulted in success for the physicians. They face the fact that quality
health care alone may not be enough to sway public opinion. Indeed, physicians place
themselves in the position of having to deal with countervailing modes of influence.
The history of propositions 214 and 216, two proposals aimed at ending unfair and
unethical managed care practices in the state of California, are prime examples of this
phenomenon. Both propositions, introduced as precursors to the creation of the Health
Care Patient Protection Act of 1996, called for the following measures, reported in the
Fall 1996 Physicians Who Care Newsletter.
A. Banning all written gag clauses;
B. Outlawing financial bonuses tied to the denial of necessary care;
C. [Giving] patients the right to [pursue] a second opinion before denying
doctor-recommended care and [publicizing] HMO guidelines for denying
treatment;
D. Requiring "just cause" for [terminating services] of physicians and other
professionals. 95
Proposition 216, the more radical of the initiatives, also added clauses that included
establishing "a consumer watchdog organization, and [imposing] taxes on health-care
mergers and acquisitions, hospital closures, and bed reductions."96
The goals of both propositions offered something for everyone. Not only would pa-
tients be protected against financial incentives that may influence a physician's quality
of care, but the doctors themselves would be free from the threat of the gag clauses that
silence them. Both measures gained huge support from more than 1 50 interest groups
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and individuals on the state and national level. Activist Ralph Nader proclaimed, "Pass-
ing the Patient Protection Act is the single most critical health care battle this year for
California and as an example for the rest of the nation. . . . The denial of care, gag rules
for doctors and nurses ... are a national scandal."97
It is also important to realize that neither proposition called for "new taxes, litiga-
tion, or government agencies."98 Considering the propositions' comprehensive pro-
grams, it was almost impossible to imagine the public's not passing them. Yet both
failed on the ballot, even with the support of thousands of physicians and ordinary citi-
zens nationwide. In a poll conducted days before the election, 46 percent of the 824
people surveyed indicated that they would vote against both propositions, while an
additional 25 percent and 26 percent remained undecided about 214 and 216, respec-
tively.
99 On Election Day, 214 failed by a ratio of 58 to 42 percent, and 216 by 61 to 39
percent. 100
A perplexing question is central to examining the failure: How could the citizens of
California, a state with more than 30 million residents, 58 percent of whom are enrolled
in HMOs, vote against propositions so clearly designed to protect them from unethical
managed care? Some groups, Taxpayers Against Higher Health Costs, for example,
interpreted the defeat as an indication that "Californians [were saying] no to more gov-
ernment involvement in health care," which reflects today's probusiness, promarket,
antigovernment sentiment. 101 Health care reform appears to be unnecessary if the market
provides checks and balances as it should. One opponent of the propositions stated,
"Those opposed to [managed care] think we will suffer as soulless bean counters deny
[us] needed care . . . But free-market capitalism creates a powerful check on such ten-
dencies." 102
Another explanation points to the lack of voter understanding surrounding the propo-
sitions. When asked specifics about each proposition in a preelection poll, respondents'
answers reflected "confusion about what is what and what each would do" and high-
lighted an overall general confusion about managed care. 103
The media's role in the failure offers a further possibility. The proponents of these
proposals, physicians included, were unsuccessful in transmitting the message that for-
profit managed care organizations, through the use of gag rules and unethical incen-
tives, pose a legitimate threat to the health and well-being of patients. The print media
opposed the propositions. Editorials in fifty major newspapers across California recom-
mended a no vote on both. 104 The state's largest newspaper, The Los Angeles Times, held
nothing back in its attack. It recognized the "[legitimate] problems"of the HMO system
but stood firmly for the rights of the corporation. In its evaluation of the propositions,
the Times concluded, "They [are] fuzzily worded provisions. Both [for example] try to
eliminate gag rules by allowing caregivers to disclose information 'relevant to the pa-
tients' health care.' While physicians are certainly entitled to freedom of speech, man-
aged care companies should be able to impose some restrictions." Focusing on the need
to contain costs, the editorial further declared that the propositions "would tie the
managed care companies, making it difficult to effect the nimble balance between
quality and cost effectiveness." 105
In sheer numbers and ability to reach and educate the public, the battle for power
between a media supporting managed care organizations in California and physicians
desiring to change unethical policies is really no contest. Yet in appealing to the public
for support, physicians must face the media as well as such other forces as antigovern-
ment sentiment that sway opinions. If propositions 214 and 216 suggest anything, it is
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that physicians collectively cannot overcome the many powers that influence the public.
On the subject of managed care, they are "pushed and pulled from all directions in the
debate . . . and are likely to remain neutralized." 106
Finding a Solution for the Future
Several issues emerge from the foregoing. First, much as physicians would like to be-
lieve otherwise, they have for decades had to grapple with finding a niche in their pro-
fessional role for the businessperson. One must realize that although the public never
approved of this new role and was often frightened and threatened by it, the profession
persisted in its attempts to embrace it. Because their professional status and power al-
lowed it, doctors could manipulate the public and control the interference of corpora-
tions and business in their work.
Now that physicians need help in reclaiming their professional power, they appear to
have nowhere to turn. Corporate takeovers are still rampant in medicine, and although
some state and federal legislation has managed to ban a number of unethical incentives
and gag clauses, problems persist. Americans should be deeply concerned about the
deprofessionalization of medicine and the dangers associated with "bad managed care,
investor-owned, for-profit entities operated by insurance companies and managers with
little or no experience in health care delivery," but confusion and lack of awareness
distance them from the issues. 107
Attempting to dismantle managed care is not an appropriate solution — the managed
care model of medicine is apparently here to stay. The number of people in some sort of
managed care arrangement increases every year. For example, "In 1995, 54 million
Americans were enrolled in health maintenance organizations and as many as 130 mil-
lion [were] insured in one or another form of managed care." 108 This number represents
an increase of 13 percent from 1994. 109 Therefore, abandoning the managed care con-
cept is currently not practical or possible.
To accomplish anything, physicians must come to grips with their position rather
than ignoring indicators that suggest the decline of their professional status. As Freidson
and Lundberg asserted years ago, they must focus on the original goals of their profes-
sion, primarily patient advocacy. Furthermore, unless doctors resist the businessperson
mentality, which historically has always undermined them, their autonomy will vanish.
We will enter an era in which medical knowledge, and its use and distribution, is con-
trolled by businesspeople. As this occurs, patients will suffer and continue to lose faith
in physicians, widening an already large rift between the two camps.
The success or failure of physicians and patients in regaining control of health care
will depend largely on the degree of willingness of all parties to be radical and progres-
sive. Specifically, physicians must be ready and willing to work with the public and
other health care professionals to effect change. As Woolhandler and Himmelstein as-
sert, "We must scale care to a human size . . . Unless HMO physicians, workers, and
patients are centrally involved in planning this transformation, and the movement for
reform, it will surely fail." 110
Glimmers of this mentality and its possible benefits are coming to the surface. For
example, in June 1996 the American Medical Group Association (AMGA) was formed
"from the merger of the American Group Practice Association and the Unified Medical
Group Association." 111 This new confederation of more than 350 group practice associa-
tions, which brings together administrators, physicians, and patients, states that its
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primary goals include serving as "an information resource for group practice administra-
tors and as an advocacy group for physician decision-making and managed care re-
form."" 2 The group also plans to continue to build upon a "patient-centered outcomes
database," thus creating for patients a "sounding board" on which they can voice their
concerns and rate their quality of care. 113
The birth of the AMGA is certainly an encouraging sign, but for real change to oc-
cur, a more radical approach is necessary. I suggest that the American Medical Associa-
tion become the organization that unifies patients, physicians, and other health care
workers in their battle against corporate medicine. The AMA already identifies itself as
"a grassroots organization [that] has served as a national leader in efforts to extend
access, contain costs, and improve the quality of the American health care system. The
AMA is extremely active in public health campaigns, working vigorously for healthy
lifestyles."
114
If this is indeed the mission of the AMA, it should have no problem taking
a stand against the corruptive nature of so many for-profit HMOs, but as Howard
Wolinsky and Tom Brune report, the AMA has never truly attempted to help patients,
and in fact billed itself as one of the "most powerful political lobbies [not] to protect
our rights as patients . . . Rather, it has worked hard to look after physician income and
interest."
115
In the health care crisis sweeping the nation, the AMA has the potential to play a
tremendous role. It could, without much internal turmoil, undertake the following:
1
.
Advocate socially responsible investing — encourage people to divest
their stock portfolios of profit-making HMOs that use financial incen-
tives and gag clauses.
2. Support any state or federal legislation that encourages increased patient
and physician protection, such as propositions 214 and 216, providing
funds and manpower for campaigns.
3. Launch a national HMO awareness campaign — flood the media with in
formation concerning gag clauses and other pros and cons of managed
care.
4. Develop a code of ethics for all managed care corporations, creating an
obtainable balance between business concerns and medical ethics.
5. Change medical school curricula to include a mandatory internship in a
managed care setting for all students. As of now, only 16 percent of
schools have this requirement. 116
6. Create a patient organization that works closely with other AMA groups
in advocacy projects.
7. Invite patients to serve on patient-physician committees designed to
monitor activities of the many large for-profit HMOs.
8. Provide financial support to patients who rightfully sue HMOs for
breach of contract or malpractice.
More radically, the AMA could use its vast resources to support many grassroots
organizations, such as Health Care for All of Boston, which attempt to provide quality
medical care to those who cannot afford it. The possibilities are endless.
Robert Larsen states, "There is a window of opportunity for someone to step up to
the plate and provide the vision that can eliminate many of the current [health care]
dilemmas." 117 I believe that the AMA can accomplish this task. It comes down to the
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organization's willingness to change reality, not simply an image, as Lundberg sug-
gested. The American Medical Association stands ready to deliver, but will it meet the
call or retreat? Only time will tell. Until then, we have to wait, hoping that the situation
does not become progressively worse. **
/ extend special thanks to Professor Jeanne Guillemin and Professor Ritchie Lowry for
their comments on earlier drafts of this work.
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